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TRIAL BY CHAMPION
George J. Alexander*
I. INTRODUCTION
The dignity of the human person ... requires that every man
enjoy the right to act freely and responsibly. For this reason,
therefore . .. man should exercise his rights, fulfill his obliga-
tions and, in the countless forms of collaboration with others,
act chiefly on his own responsibility and initiative.'
The law reflects, in a significant way, the values of the society
in which it is practiced. Respect for the dignity of each individual is
a fundamental value of our society. Self-determination is essential to
the preservation of dignity. Therefore the legal system of the United
States purports to accord dramatic acknowledgment to the criminal
defendant or civil litigant as an autonomous individual.
This libertarian ideal is embodied in a number of familiar
phrases. It is said that ours is a society of laws, not men; that all
men are created equal and stand equal before the law; and that con-
sequently any individual, no matter how lowly, can challenge any
other, no matter how powerful, with the outcome of his legal battle
determined solely on the merits of his case.
Obviously, these ideas express an ideal that we can never fully
realize. The President of the United States is a more formidable ad-
versary in the system than a ghetto youth charged with a drug of-
fense. It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. The following
discussion, however, does not focus on this kind of inequality before
the law. Instead, the concern here is with a legal fallacy. The legal
system purports that it is really the individual, the autonomous
human being, who is accorded his day in court and his opportunity
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to do combat with his adversary or society. This facet of the individ-
ualistic ideal, in actuality is more fallacy than fact for the "normal"
defendant. And for the defendant accused of mental illness, it is al-
most totally illusory.
One need not dig deeply before discovering that the idealized
individual confrontation that our legal mythology would lead us to
believe exists is in fact very limited. The temples of law are the sa-
cred provinces of lawyers. As a rule, in these temples, as in all
others, only the priests are heard; the penitents are reduced to silence
or are allowed, at most, to utter some ritual incantations taught them
by the priests. One of the functions of the lawyers is to protect their
sacred precincts from pollution by the spiritually unclean-that is,
by anyone who is not a lawyer and an "officer of the court."
This interposition of attorneys in the legal process frequently
deprives individuals of their autonomy. As Professor Sylvia A. Law
has written:
A lawyer has a special skill and power to enable individuals to
know the options available to them. . . . [However], [flar too
often, professional attitude, rather than serving to enhance indi-
vidual autonomy and self-control, serves to strip people of au-
tonomy and power. Rather than encouraging clients and citizens
to know and control their options and lives, the legal profession
discourages client participation and control of their own legal
claims.2
Under the guise of zealous representation of a client's best interests,
lawyers too often usurp the individual's power of self-determination,
preempt their client's decisions, and destroy the client's dignity and
humanity in the process.
Persons accused of mental illness are even more prone to this
legal usurpation. Although society claims to be solicitous of their
needs-or, perhaps better, of their legal salvation-the mentally ill
cannot participate in the ceremonies of legal adjudication even to the
extent allowed to the non-ordained "layman." Why are lay persons,
and to an even greater extent the allegedly mentally ill, so divorced
from the legal process? The answers to these questions are rooted in
the history of law and the adversary system.
2. S.A. LAW, AFTERWORD: THE PURPOSE OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, LOOKING
AT LAW SCHOOL, 205, 212-13 (S. Gillers ed. 1977), quoted in Freedman, supra note 1, at
197 (1978).
[Vol. 24
TRIAL BY CHAMPION
II. TRIAL BY ORDEAL
One of the deepest and thickest roots of our contemporary ad-
versary system of justice is its earlier form known as trial by ordeal.
In his great work on this subject,' Henry Charles Lea showed that
trial by ordeal has been practiced by people throughout all parts of
the world. Its widespread popularity springs from the universal
human abhorrence of doubt and the primitive human propensity to
resolve doubt by means of chance or choice attributed to divine inter-
vention. "To this tendency of human mind," writes Lea,
[M]en, oppressed with doubt, have essayed in all ages to relieve
themselves from responsibility by calling in the assistance of
Heaven. Nor, in so doing, have they seemed to appreciate the
self-exaltation implied in the act itself, but in all humility have
cast themselves and their sorrows at the feet of the Great Judge,
making a merit of abnegating the reason which, however lim-
ited, has been bestowed to be used and not rejected.4
The Chinese method of resolving marital conflict was rather
hard on wives and their lovers, faithfully reflecting the values of the
society in which it was practiced.' The European versions of trial by
ordeal reflect the values of the people who practiced them: the super-
stitions of Christian theology and the literality of belief in original
sin, a belief which made all persons accused of crime guilty until
proven otherwise, as all were guilty of sin by nature. One favorite
method with both secular and ecclesiastic authorities in the Middle
Ages was the ordeal of boiling water. To determine guilt or inno-
cence the subject thrust his hand into a caldron of boiling water: if
the part was scalded, he was guilty; if it was not, he was innocent.
That this was an essentially religious procedure is demonstrated in
3. H. LEA, THE ORDEAL, (A. Howland & E. Peters ed. 1973).
4. Id. at 4. Lea cites the following example from China.
If an injured husband surprises his wifeflagrante delicto, he is at liberty to slay
the adulterous pair on the spot; but he must then cut off their heads and carry
them to the nearest magistrate, before whom it is incumbent on him to prove his
innocence and demonstrate the truth of his story. As external evidence is not
often to be had in such cases, the usual mode of trial is to place the heads in a
large tub of water, which is violently stirred. The heads, in revolving, naturally
come together in the centre, when, if they meet back to back, the victims are
pronounced guiltless and the husband is punished as a murderer; but if they
meet face to face, the truth of his statement is accepted as demonstrated, he is
gently bastinadoed to teach him that wives should be more closely watched, and
is presented with a small sum of money wherewith to purchase another spouse.
Id.
5. Id. at 7.
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Lea's following account:
After the hand had been plunged in the seething caldron, it was
carefully enveloped in a cloth, sealed with the signet of the
judge, and three days afterwards it was unwrapped, when the
guilt or innocence of the party was announced by the condition
of the member. By way of extra precaution, in some rituals it is
ordered that during this interval holy water and blessed salt be
mingled in all the food and drink of the patient-presumably to
avert diabolic interference with the result.6
This example is revealing, not only as an illustration of this
ordeal, but also as evidence that people then used religion to resolve
their doubts much as we now use psychiatry to resolve ours. By this
method, an ancient pagan custom which medieval Europeans chris-
tianized, doubt was resolved through the vehicle of religion. Ecclesi-
astic law offered the following justification for the use and efficacy of
the ordeal: "Because in boiling water the guilty are scalded and the
innocent are unhurt, because Lot escaped unharmed from the fire of
Sodom, and the future fire which will precede the terrible Judge will
be harmless to the Saints, and will burn the wicked as in the Babylo-
nian furnace of old."'7
The medieval ordeal most widely remembered today is that
which was most widely used in witch trials-the ordeal by cold
water or so-called "swimming", an obvious euphemism for "sink-
ing." The accused, typically a woman charged with witchcraft, was
dropped in a river with her hands and feet tied. If she sank, she was
innocent; if she floated she was guilty. While we may view this as an
obvious plot to murder the defendant, to our forebearers this seemed
to be a genuine test consistent with their religious beliefs. Witches
and sorcerers were, after all, possessed by and acted as the agents of
Satan: "[Flrom their intercourse with Satan, [they] partake of his
nature; he resides within them, and their human attributes become
altered to his; he is an imponderable spirit of air, and therefore they
likewise become lighter than water."' Clearly, in medieval times,
perhaps even more than in ours, it was a good idea to avoid being a
6. Id. at 34-35.
7. Id. at 36. The ordeal by fire, practiced by many cultures, is a variation on the ordeal
by boiling water. There are allusions or references to it in Hindu Vedic writings, in Greek
tragedy, and in Judaism. Lea cites the "Rabbinical story of Abraham when he was cast into a
fiery furnace by Nimrod, for reproving the idolatry of the latter, and escaped unharmed from
the flames .... " Id. at 57-58. The persistent popularity of this method of ascertaining guilt
or innocence is dramatically demonstrated by its employment in Naples as recently as 1811.
Id. at 71.
8. Id. at 81.
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defendant.
After trial by ordeal came trial by combat. Here the defendant
was pitted against a person who was not exactly like our public
prosecutor, nor like an executioner, but who served a function that
was a mixture of the two. If the defendant was not defeated, he was
pronounced innocent.9 Exceptions were quickly made to the rule that
the battle had to be fought by the accused. Women and children
were declared to be unable to fend for themselves and were provided
"champions." ' 0 It also occurred to some that it could not be true that
all the tall, strong defendants were always more innocent than the
small, frail ones. To deal with this discrepancy, the practice of as-
signing champions to men and women alike began. A special class of
champions developed, composed in part of persons who had previ-
ously acquitted themselves of their own charges." The practice of
having one's innocence demonstrated by the skill of a hired sword
continued until relatively recently when the practice was outlawed in
England in 1819." Whether there were neighborhood offices of the
public champions, and whether the courts of the day held that the
state was required to furnish an adequate champion, seem somehow
to have been lost in the literature.
A basic assumption underlies the historic judicial processes dis-
cussed above: a person may be appropriately represented by another.
Although the issue at hand was always the guilt or innocence of a
particular individual, the persons and processes used to ascertain
this judgment focused not on the accused but on some action taken
by another on his behalf Trial by ordeal was thought to operate by
divine intervention. Perhaps figuratively to us, but literally to our
forebears, God was the champion of the innocent. In trial by combat,
it is not so much divine intervention as the romantic notion that be-
ing right is expected to be productive of a just result. One major
change from these systems to our modern one is that we have substi-
tuted words for weapons. The champion now becomes the lawyer,
and the combat focuses on the language of accusation and defense.
Divine intervention has been replaced by psychiatric interventionjust as the ideology of medicine has supplanted that of religion.
Thus, much as before, the system carefully keeps the defendant out
of the contest and focuses attention instead on his champion.
9. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 632-33 (2d ed.
1899).
10. G. NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT (1890), 48-54.
11. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 633.
12. d. at 632.
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III. THE RIGHT TO SELF REPRESENTATION
Although defendants have long been represented by champions,
today a criminal defendant has the right to represent himself and his
own interests in court. This has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California."3 The Court held
that the right to defend pro se springs from the Constitution itself:
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense
shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused person-
ally the right to make his defense .... Although not stated in
the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representa-
tion-to make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily
implied by the structure of the Amendment. 14 The language and
spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like
the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be
an aid to a willing defendant-not an organ of the State in-
terposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to de-
fend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused,
against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the
Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a
master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the per-
sonal character upon which the Amendment insists.5 The right
to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the
State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is
the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide
whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And
although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own
detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for
the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." 16
Although the Court's opinion emphasizes "respect for the indi-
vidual" and the "personal character" of the choice to defend oneself,
it also requires that the defendant's choice be "knowingly and intelli-
gently" made.
1 7
How, then, do courts decide who is competent to exercise this
personal right and who must be defended by a champion? The
guidelines vary. Some courts hold that a person must be "sui juris
13. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
14. Id. at 819.
15. Id. at 820 (footnote omitted).
16. Id. at 834 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 834-35. Although the court does not define what it means by "knowingly and
intelligently," it does state that technical legal knowledge is not relevant to an assessment of an
accused's knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. See Id. at 836.
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and mentally competent,"'" meaning that anyone fit to stand trial,
that is anyone who is not insane, is fit to defend himself. Other
courts deny the right to defend oneself to any defendant who is pos-
sessed by "ignorance, feeblemindedness, youthfulness, illiteracy, or
the like." ' In this formulation, the notion of "incompetence" falls
far short of a determination of mental illness; the principle of
"parens patriae" implicit in this perspective could easily be inter-
preted to encompass the entire population.
In determining competency to represent oneself, the state's "bet-
ter judgment" is substituted for the individual's decision through the
concept of waiver. Although there are statements to the effect that
the right to counsel and the right to dispense with counsel are "cor-
relative and coequal," 20 in fact the courts do not recognize that coe-
quality. The Court in Faretta recognized that the right to self-repre-
sentation does not arise "mechanically from a defendant's power to
waive the right to assistance of counsel."'" The Court required that
"in order to represent himself the accused must 'knowingly and in-
telligently' forego those relinquished benefits""2 associated with the
right to counsel. The right to counsel and the right to self-represen-
tation are mutually incompatible. It is necessary to waive one in or-
der to elect the other." With more ruse than respect, however,
judges have seized on the waiver of one right to prevent the election
of the other. The following is an illustration of the way this judicial
assault on individual self-determination has operated.
The California courts have held that while it is reversible error
to refuse to allow a competent accused to defend himself, the defen-
dant must first waive his right to counsel. Further, they have held
that the presumption against the waiver of such a constitutional right
is very strong,24 that the defendant's waiver of counsel must be "in-
telligent and understanding,"2 " and that the factors that determine
whether or not a waiver meets these requirements include the defen-
dant's age, education, social background, psychological maturity,
knowledge of the law, and the seriousness of the charges against
18. See, e.g., Mackenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1959).
19. See, e.g., Ex Parte Cornell, 193 P.2d 904 (Okla. 1948).
20. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); see also United
States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
21. 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975).
22. Id. at 835.
23. See Woolard v. United States, 178 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1949).
24. People v. Carter, 66 Cal. 2d 666, 427 P.2d 214, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967).
25. People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 63 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1968).
1984]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
him.2 6
These courts have thus refused to recognize a simple truth: if
the rights to counsel and to reject counsel are truly equal, the ac-
cused would have to waive his right to defend himself before he
could exercise his right to be represented by counsel. This waiver of
self-representation would also have to conform to all of the strictures
governing the waiver of counsel. A defendant deemed competent
enough to "waive" self-representation or accept counsel should like-
wise be deemed competent enough to "waive" counsel and represent
himself. The discrepancy between the waiver requirements is not a
rational one.
This differential treatment of the right to counsel and the right
to self-representation diminishes the power of individual defendants
and may reflect judicial confusion: the courts simply fail to distin-
guish between waiver as a forfeiture of the right and waiver as the
election of one. This confusion is evidenced by Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Faretta:
In short, both the 'spirit and the logic' of the Sixth Amendment
are that every person accused of crime shall receive the fullest
possible defense; in the vast majority of cases this command can
be honored only by means of the expressly guaranteed right to
counsel, and the trial judge is in the best position to determine
whether the accused is capable of conducting his defense. True
freedom of choice and society's interest in seeing that justice is
achieved can be vindicated only if the trial court retains discre-
tion to reject any attempted waiver of counsel and insist that the
accused be tried according to the Constitution."7
It makes sense for the courts, as the protector of the weak individual
against the strong state, to require the state to carry the heavy bur-
den of proof in asserting that a defendant has waived his constitu-
tional right to counsel. It makes no sense, at least not from this indi-
vidualistic point of view, for the courts to use this device, designed to
protect the defendant, to prevent him from protecting himself. If a
person is considered to be accountable in court for his behavior, if he
is competent to stand trial or to be a litigant, then he ought to be free
to choose between one of two mutually incompatible rights, regard-
less of whether a judge considers his choice wise.28
26. People v. Lee, 249 Cal. App. 2d 234, 57 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1967), cert.denied, 389
U.S. 876 (1967).
27. 422 U.S. 806, 840 (1975).
28. As indicated in his dissent in Faretta, Justice Blackmun would probably never con-
sider it wise for a defendant to choose to represent himself: "If there is any truth to the old
[Vol. 24
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Occasionally, people do conduct their own trials and sometimes
do so splendidly, especially when they have something to say that has
not yet been accepted by the orthodoxy of the law. The self-expres-
sion of a sincere and inspired defendant can far better persuade a
jury than the intercessions of a defense attorney who is too con-
forming and timid. Howard Roark's defense, in The Fountainhead,
of his destruction of his butchered, plagiarized architecture,29 and the
real life ordeal of Angela Davis, 0 are two such examples. But both
of these figures were lucky in that their sanity was not questioned.
The sad truth is that no person accused of being of unsound mind,
can possibly hope to waive counsel, conduct his own hearing, or even
assist in his own defense. All these rights and privileges are taken
from him. 1 Neither American psychiatrists, nor American lawyers
and courts, nor the American people have been able to define an
unsound mind. This militates to the advantage of the present law,
and to the disadvantages of the person accused of possessing such a
mind.
Much like the "sound mind" requirement for self-representa-
tion is the "sound mind" requirement to stand trial at all. Under the
Constitution, no person can be tried unless he is able to assist in his
own defense.3 2 The skills required are cognitive. He must be able to
understand the proceedings and to communicate with his attorney.
Theoretically, this protection is an outgrowth of the prohibition
against trial in absentia; practically, it is the measure par excellence
that has been used to deprive all kinds of persons of trial on the mere
accusation that they were mentally ill and hence unfit to stand
trial.33 Until only a few years ago, innocent persons could be, and
often were, imprisoned in hospitals for the criminally insane on such
a charge of mental unsoundness; once so imprisoned, they had to
wait, often for decades or forever, until the hospital managers de-
clared them fit to stand trial.
The fuss over effective assistance is hard to understand. In actu-
ality, when a person wants to use the services of a lawyer, and has
the resources to pay for those services, his own participation in the
proverb that '[o]ne who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client,' the court by its opinion today
now bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of himself. Id. at 852.
29. A. RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1943).
30. People v. Davis and Magee, No. 3744 (Super. Ct., Cty. of Marin, Cal., Nov. 10,
1971).
31. See T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965).
32. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
33. T. SZASZ, supra note 31.
1984]
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trial as a defendant is probably quite minimal. If he prefers to be
inactive, he does not have to do anything but can let his lawyer de-
fend him. Thus, the legal requirement that the defendant be able "to
assist in his own defense" is, when used against the defendant's self-
defined interests, much like his "right to counsel": both are "Catch
22's" with which to ensnare him in the web of forensic psychiatry.
This fact has at last been discovered by the law itself, and the tactic
is increasingly being declared unconstitutional. 3 '
IV. THE CASE OF NICOLA SACCO
There are many examples of famous defendants being denied
the right to self-representation, being saddled with counsel they did
not want, being incriminated by such counsel as mentally ill-and,
consequently, being committed to a mental hospital. The case of
Ezra Pound is one instance.8 5 That of Nicola Sacco is another. 6 The
seven-year trial of Sacco, which resulted in his and co-defendant
Bartolomeo Vanzetti's execution, dramatically illustrates the impor-
tance of the right to self-representation.
On April 15, 1920, in South Braintree, Massachusetts, two men
employed by a local shoe factory were robbed and murdered. On
May 5, Sacco and Vanzetti, both Italian immigrants, one a shoe
worker, the other a fish peddler, were arrested. The two were
brought to trial in 1921, convicted, and after numerous appeals were
executed on August 27, 1927. Although it is unclear whether or not
these men were innocent, many believed that Sacco and Vanzetti
were convicted more for their radical political beliefs than for having
committed the charged crimes. Guilt or innocence, however, is irrele-
vant to the issue to be explored here-namely, the denial of Sacco's
right to self-representation.
On February 14, 1923, after he had been in jail for two years,
Sacco went on a hunger strike. In Tragedy in Dedham, Francis Rus-
sell provides details on what followed:
Sheriff Capen made no attempt to force him to eat, and by the
middle of March he had grown noticeably weaker. On the af-
ternoon of the sixteenth, at Judge Thayer's request, he was ex-
amined by Charles Cahoon, superintendent of the Medfield
State Hospital; Albert Thomas, superintendent of the Foxboro
34. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
35. T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963), Ch. 17.
36. See F. RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM: THE STORY OF THE SACCO-VANZETTI
CASE (1971).
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State Hospital; and a Boston psychiatrist, Abraham Meyerson.
Sacco, lying on his cot, calmly explained to the doctors that the
state was trying to kill him. Poison was being put into his
food-even into the food his wife brought him . . ..
Instead of waiting to be killed by the state, Sacco asserted that
he preferred to starve himself to death. Ready to perform an execu-
tion, but not willing to countenance suicide, the state thus found it-
self in a precarious position. And here is where psychiatry came to
the rescue of the law.
The doctors found that Sacco was mentally disturbed, and
Judge Thayer ordered him to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital
for observation. On his arrival he was warned by Dr. Meyer-
son, "Nick, they have sent you here to eat, and if you don't, we
will feed you with a tube." According to the newspaper reports
he was then forcibly fed by an attendant in the doctor's presence
38
Sacco was, of course, represented by counsel: Fred H. Moore, a
young attorney who specialized in defending "radicals," had been
retained and paid by the "Sacco and Vanzetti Defense Committee."
Why did Moore take the case? According to Russell, because:
Sacco and Vanzetti were to typify a cause, Moore explained to
a friend, adding, 'In saving them we strengthen our muscles,
develop our forces preparatory to the day we save ourselves.'
The more extreme anarchists of the Defense Committee were
critical of such an attitude, feeling that Moore was more inter-
ested in building up the biggest labor case in history than in the
fate of the men involved. This, too, was [Mrs.] Rosina Sacco's
feeling from the first time she met Moore. . . . Instinctively,
she distrusted the sparkle of the bohemian lawyer.3 9
Indeed, it was Moore who staged the drama of the Sacco and
Vanzetti "case" as we now know it; who, in Russell's words,
"painted the affair in broad expressionistic strokes, embellished it
and retouched it, spread the panoramic design on a world canvas.
But for Moore there would have been no case as it is today
remembered . . 40
The attorney for the defense acted not as an agent of his client,
but rather as an agent of himself or of the "cause" he fancied himself
37. Id. at 238.
38. Id. at 238-39.
39. Id. at 112-13.
40. Id. at 125.
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as serving. As a result, Moore could not and did not represent
Sacco's interests as Sacco himself saw them. If he had, he might have
pleaded with the court that Sacco had as much right to take his own
life as the state had to take it. The forced feedings of a prisoner by
physicians-of any prisoner, but especially of one headed for execu-
tion-constituted an impermissible corruption of the medical man-
date and an unconstitutional deprivation of the prisoner's civil rights.
Moore did not assert this point of view for his client. Instead, he had
Sacco committed to Bridgewater Institution; he signed the commit-
ment papers himself.
Sacco was diagnosed as suffering from psychosis of a paranoid
character. The court committed him on April 23 [1923] to the
Bridgewater State Hospital for the Criminally Insane. Moore
was greatly troubled by Sacco's suicide attempts. As one way of
saving his client he had agreed to Sacco's examination by alien-
ists and-even though he objected to the Bridgewater Institu-
tion-signed the commitment papers. Sacco and his wife never
forgave him for it, and the differences of opinion that had
troubled the two men now began to harden into enmity.41
It is crystal clear that the judicial system of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts had inflicted an enormous injustice on Sacco. The
"injustice" did not spring from the possibility that he was not given
a fair trial (although perhaps he was not), nor from the possibility
that he was convicted although innocent. Rather, this "injustice"
stemmed from the fact that he was deprived of the right to self-rep-
resentation. It was not his conviction alone, but his dehumanization
by the legal process that offends the conscience. The enormity of this
indignity is eloquently expressed in a remarkable letter from Sacco
to Moore. The letter, quoted exactly as it was written, is reproduced
below:
Sir: -Saturday I received your letter with enclose the post card
that Mrs. Mateola Robbins sent me-and the little pamphlet
that you use to send me it just to insult my soul. Yes, it is true,
because you would not forget when you came here two or three
times between last month with a groups of people-that you
know that I did not like to see them any more; but you broad
them just seem to make my soul feel just sad as it could be. And
I can see how clever and cynic you are, because after all my
protest, after I have been chase you and all yours philanthropist
friends of the "New Trial League Committee" not to print any
41. Id. at 241.
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more these letters with my picture and name on, and to be sure
to take my name out if they should print any more of these little
pamphlets, because you and yours philanthropist has been use it
from last three years like a instrument of infamous specula-
tion. . . .I am telling you that you goin to stop this dirty game!
Your heare me? I mean every them word I said here, because I
do not want have anything to do any more with "New Trial
League Committee," because it does repugnant my coscience.
Maney time you have been deluder and abuse on weakness of
my comrades good faith, but I want you to stop no and if you
please get out of my case, because you know that you are the
obstacle of the case; and say! I had been told that from last May
twenty fifth-that was the last time you came see me, and with
you came comrade Felicani and Profess Guadagni. Do you re-
member? Well, from that day I told you to get out of my case,
and you promised me that you was goin to get out, but
my-dear-Mr. Moore! I see that you are still in my case, and
you are still continued to play your famous gam. Of course it is
pretty hard to refuse a such sweet pay that as been come to you
right long-in-this big-game. It is no true what I said?...
Well-! anyhow, wherever you do if you do not intent to get out
of my case, remember this, that per September I want my case
finish. But remember that we are right near September now
and I don't see anything and any move yet. So tell me please
why you waiting now for? Do you wait till I hang myself.
That's what you wish? Lett me tal you right now don't be illuse
yourself because I would not be surprise if somebody will find
you some morning hang on lamp-post.
Your implacable enemy, now and forever,
Nick Sacco4
Moore thereupon withdrew from the case. Although only a year
before he considered Sacco mad enough to have him committed to
the insane asylum, he now evidently considered him sane enough to
discharge his own defense attorney. He was not, however, deemed
sane enough to represent himself and avoid Moore's charade.
V. HABEUS CORPUS AND THE SOUND MIND REQUIREMENT
Although a "sound mind" is a requirement both for standing
trial and self-representation, persons accused of mental illness are
often forced to perform. both functions unfairly. This happens typi-
cally when a person incarcerated in a mental hospital petitions for
42. Id. at 254-55.
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his release.48 The writ of habeas corpus may be employed to test the
legality of any person's detention anywhere-whether in prison or a
mental hospital. While the petitioner is incarcerated, the keeper may
be required to explain why his prisoner is held in captivity. The
proceeding is heard by a judge who then renders a decision to release
or reincarcerate the prisoner. Committed mental patients have long
and fruitlessly sought this avenue of escape from the madhouse.
Most of the persons who engage in this effort are poor and hence
cannot retain counsel. Lawyers have traditionally avoided such cases,
presumably because they themselves believe that "crazy" people
should be behind bars and that they would not be behind the bars of
madhouses if they were not "crazy."
The result is that almost all hospitalized mental patients who
petition for a writ of habeas corpus represent themselves. They ap-
pear in court, call their witnesses, if they have any, and present their
argument to the judge. This often takes only a few minutes, after
which the judge almost invariably pronounces them in need of con-
tinued institutional care and sends them back to the "hospital." The
"patient" can later apply for another writ and sustain another dis-
missal; this charade of a day in court may go on for years. According
to one study, during the fiscal year of 1965-66 there were 292 ap-
pearances by patients on writs of habeas corpus from the Matteawan
(N.Y.) State Hospital; in only five of these cases was the patient's
writ sustained. 4
The absurdity of this procedure, not just legally but logically, is
apparent. Here are "patients" who are in the "hospital" because
they have been adjudged mentally incapable of assisting in their own
defense and hence unfit to stand trial. Yet, in the habeas corpus
hearing, which is also a trial, the court allows the same persons not
only to stand trial but to represent themselves!
VI. SELF REPRESENTATION AND THE MENTALLY ILL
It is evident that while the right to self-representation is an es-
sential right for persons engaged in any kind of litigation, it is espe-
cially important for persons charged with crimes. It is even more
important for persons charged with crimes that inflame political pas-
sions, and perhaps most important for persons charged with mental
illness. The reason for this is that the litigant's right to trial is so
43. T. SZASZ, supra note 35, Ch. 14.
44. See NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION AND FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL, MENTAL
ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS, AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 189 (1968).
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easily changed into, and subverted by, his alleged supervening right
to psychiatric treatment.'
The 1972 proposed Federal Rules of Evidence governing the
legal relationship between the psychiatrist and his client exemplify
this denial of the alleged mental patient's integrity and self-determi-
nation. These rules recognize a medical privilege between the psy-
chiatrist and his patient.' This privilege may seem enlightened and
protective of both patient and psychiatrist, but in fact it is neither.
Elsewhere in the same rules the privilege is waived whenever the
psychiatrist concludes that he must use the information entrusted to
him in confidence to effect the patient's commitment to a mental hos-
pital.4 Although the patient seems to be guaranteed a confidential
relationship with his psychiatrist in order to make his treatment ef-
fective, he is, in fact, guaranteed no such thing unless he agrees that
the "psychiatrist knows best." The "right to treatment" is thus sym-
metrical with the right to counsel. The right to treatment is the de-
nial of the right to reject treatment. The right to counsel is the denial
of the right to reject counsel. Beneath these deprivations of the right
45. Hardly a day passes that one does not see a report in the daily press of the denial of
the right to self-representation justified on psychiatric grounds. Here is such a real story:
"Girlfriend Admits Killing," read the headline. The relevant parts of the story, excerpted
from the Associated Press report, are as follows:
JoAnne Brown has blurted out that she killed her boyfriend, law secretary Burr
Hollister. . . . But the Long Island woman's attorney replies that she is obvi-
ously deranged. . . . Judge John D. Campilli held her without bail for mental
tests. . . . Mrs. Brown surrendered Tuesday to Nassau County Chief of Detec-
tives Edward Curran. She appeared calm Wednesday in court as her attorney,
Robert Rivers, obtained Campilli's court order that she undergo psychiatric ex-
amination on Rivers' contention that she was not competent to stand trial. Riv-
ers said she has been under psychiatric treatment for at least five years and was
'not a rational person.' As Mrs. Brown was being led from the building she
sobbed to reporters: 'I am being framed for this. I killed Burr and I'm ready to
talk about it. They are trying to make me think I'm sick.'... Rivers was not
present when she said she killed Hollister, but he said later in his Westbury
office that 'I can't be responsible for what she says because I believe basically
she is sick. It's obvious that she is a sick woman. Her statement simply doesn't
hold water. It's the statement of a deranged woman.'
Syracuse Herald-Journal, Oct. 24, 1974, p. 10.
46. FED. R. EvID. (Proposed) par. 504, 1972. In adopting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Congress rejected the rule expressly providing for a psychiatrist-patient privilege, noting
that "the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a
psychiatrist-patient . . . [privilege]. Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the
view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges
should be determined on a case-by-case basis."
47. Id. 504(d)(1). The rules as adopted, by requiring a case-by-case determination of
the psychiatrist-patient privilege, gives the court even more leeway to allow or require the
psychiatrist to breach the confidential relationship with his patient when he or the court be-
lieves it to be necessary.
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to self-determination lies, uneasily, a collective fear of the individual
and of the genuine exercise of his individuality. Our law bespeaks
the need to control individuality rather than foster it.48
VII. THE PARADOX OF SELF REPRESENTATION
This denial of individuality is as prominent in the courtroom
setting as it is in the denial of self-representation. In Anglo-Ameri-
can law every person is considered innocent until proven guilty. As-
suredly, this is greatly preferable to Roman law under which an ac-
cused person is guilty unless he can prove his innocence. But our
system works smoothly only as long as guilt and innocence can be
defined by and within the legal system itself. For example, if courts
were to allow defendants to talk directly to the jurors the system
might break down. A middle-class defendant charged with evading a
few thousand dollars in taxes might try to justify his individual ac-
tion by telling the jury about the tax payments of prominent politi-
cians and millionaires. Similarly, a youngster charged with smoking
marijuana might convince the jurors that many of their own children
smoke it too, and that marijuana is not so bad. These jurors, too,
might decide not to convict. In so-called political trials-such as the
cases of Sacco and Vanzetti, Ezra Pound, or Angela Davis-the pos-
sibilities of the individual defendant disrupting the trial by argu-
ments which the court, but only the court, might deem irrelevant, are
even greater and more explosive. These are the risks of self-repre-
sentation and the risks of individuality which are mitigated by the
"right to counsel" and by the professional restraints placed upon
lawyers. As Justice Blackman put it in his dissent in Faretta: "I
cannot agree that there is anything in the Due Process Clause or the
Sixth Amendment that requires the states to subordinate the solemn
business of conducting a criminal prosecution to the whimsi-
cal-albeit voluntary-caprice of every accused who wishes to use
his trial as a vehicle for personal or political self-gratification.49
Lawyers are trained to be "relevant" and not to say things
which are "prejudicial." And they learn that, although they have a
duty to defend their client, they are also "officers of the court." The
lawyer's position as an officer of the court carries with it many heavy
obligations and few noticeable advantages. If a lawyer misbehaves,
there is the awesome power called "contempt of court" to bring him
or her back into line.
48. In this connection, see T. SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY (1974).
49. 422 U.S. 806, 849 (1975).
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Not every "ignorant" defendant inclined to try his own case
knows of the "sanctity" of the courtroom; he might not understand
that the philosophical reasons for his individual actions are not rele-
vant. He might not understand or agree that judges are above criti-
cism. As a defendant he certainly would not consider himself an of-
ficer of the court. Not being an attorney, he might not be deterred by
the threat of a thirty-day contempt sentence. Having his day-his
real day!-in court might be worth much more than thirty days in
jail to him.
All these embarrassing possibilities are avoided by having the
defendant represented by an attorney, who ostensibly could do a bet-
ter job defending him. The defendant is thus handicapped, in part,
by the informal constraints of the judicial system. The accused must
have a lawyer if he is deemed incapable of "knowingly and intelli-
gently" waiving his right to be represented. When the accused is not
permitted the right to defend himself, the proceedings are then in-
creasingly focused on the lawyer instead of on the defendant. And
the lawyer, knowing that he must come back to court again after this
particular defendant's trial is over, is not likely to risk antagonizing
the court in any.way. In short, requiring professionals to play the
courtroom game guarantees the establishment norm-and sacrifices
the rights of the individual defendant. Lawyers and judges are
human beings, and everything about the courtroom situation mili-
tates toward their conformity.
But also because lawyers are human beings, there will be some
among them who will not blindly conform to the norms and pres-
sures of the judicial system. These are the legal "deviants"-the civil
right advocates and other "activists." The system, however, can ad-
just to and compensate for their irregular behavior; it does so by
treating their clients as if they were guilty until proven otherwise.
The presumption that the accused is innocent until proven
guilty is just that-a presumption. As such, it is not completely inde-
pendent of all other variables that may affect a criminal trial. Actu-
ally, this presumption applies only to conventional defendants con-
ventionally defended. The more unconventional the defendant and
the more unconventional his defense, the more the presumption of
innocence metamorphoses into a presumption of guilt. Both political
trials, and military trials which are common and relatively undra-
matic, illustrate and support this contention.
The uniform code of military justice provides for universal rep-
resentation of defendants by assigned military counsel. The military
grants these services free. The lawyers are soldiers who "under-
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stand" the needs of the military. Here, then, is a system that ideally
protects the group from the accused offender: the defendant's cham-
pion is, in fact, an agent of his adversary. This is why the mere act
of showing up at a military court martial with a civilian lawyer
shocks the administrators of the military legal system and incrimi-
nates the defendant as guilty. Mutatis mutandis, if a person accused
of a political crime chooses to be defended by a prominent activist
lawyer, he courts the risk of being widely viewed as guilty. Why else
would he pick such a defense lawyer? And if a person is accused of
mental illness and chooses to be "defended" by a psychiatrist who is
opposed to commitment he courts the risk of being widely regarded
as crazy. Why else would he pick such a psychiatrist? If these per-
sons choose their champions, whether legal or psychiatric, from
within the system, they may get not only incompetence but also con-
formity. If mental illness is introduced as an issue, they may get
committed as well.
The ethics of the legal and psychiatric professions present none
of the barriers needed to protect litigant patients from being sub-
jected to all of the unsolicited "help" they are supposed to need. The
client has a right to represent himself, but only if he can knowingly
and intelligently waive his right to counsel by the court's careful
standards. The client has a right to counsel, so counsel he gets. The
client also has a right to treatment, so if counsel in conjunction with
institutional psychiatry provides that too, is he not conducting him-
self on the highest moral plane of professional ethics?
VIII. CONCLUSION
In a free society, respect for human dignity and recognition of
individual autonomy are essential. The preservation of individual
autonomy requires that each member of society be accorded the right
to elect a course of conduct and the right to be responsible for the
consequences of that choice.
Interjecting the spurious issue of mental illness as a considera-
tion in determining a defendant's competence to stand trial and right
to choose self-representation insidiously subverts individual responsi-
bility, deprives the defendant of his autonomy and his substantive
rights, and destroys the defendant's dignity and humanity in the pro-
cess. The requirement that a defendant must "knowingly and intelli-
gently" waive his "right to counsel" before being permitted to re-
present himself must be rejected as a legal euphemism formulated by
lawyers effectively to deny the right to self-representation.
A defendant's right to represent himself and his competence to
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stand trial should be determined at a judicial hearing prior to trial.
Here, the judge should be directed to apply a purely functional stan-
dard, excluding consideration of any expert psychiatric testimony or
other "scientific evidence." There should be a very strong presump-
tion that persons are competent to assist in their own defense unless
physically unable to attend trial or totally incoherent (as opposed to
irrational). Any person marginally able to conduct his own trial
should be permitted to proceed in pro per.
When self-representation is allowed, the trial judge should have
an obligation to assist the defendant by, for example, making sugges-
tions regarding admissible evidence or by overlooking the defendant's
minor violations of the procedural rituals of the court. In certain
cases, it may be appropriate or necessary for the court to appoint
advisory counsel to assist with the defense, even if the defendant is
reluctant to accept such assistance. Such counsel would, of course,
remain subordinated to the defendant's control of the case.
In some cases, the judge will determine that the defendant is not
functionally capable of conducting his own defense, either at the pre-
trial hearing or during the trial, necessitating appointment of counsel
to represent the defendant. When a defendant is thus forced to accept
unwanted representation by appointed counsel, the assigned attorney
should still be required to be guided by the wishes of the client to the
greatest possible extent. The freedom enjoyed by attorneys in con-
ventional representation to make independent decisions regarding
procedural and other non-substantive matters should be severely cur-
tailed, and the attorney should be obliged to accord the defendant
every possible opportunity to control the proceedings.
Having thus removed the legal shackles that hinder the oppor-
tunity for self-representation, the defendant who chooses to proceed
in pro per would not be permitted thereafter to complain that his
own defense was inadequate resulting in a denial of effective assis-
tance of counsel. The choice to represent oneself carries with it the
corresponding responsibility to accept the consequences of that
choice, including the possibility of incompetent representation. How-
ever, if the trial court refused to make appropriate adjustments in
the process to accommodate the self-represented defendant, such re-
fusal would constitute adequate grounds for retrial or reversal on
appeal if found to have been prejudicial to the defendant resulting in
a miscarriage of justice. This type of trial court error would be sub-
ject to the same review process as any other.
Although the proposal outlined would undoubtedly require
other adjustments in the formalities of the legal process, the incon-
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venience or disruption engendered by the need for such adjustments
is a small price to pay. In our legal system the right of a defendant
to represent himself is a fundamental facet of his autonomy. By
choosing self-representation, the accused can at least directly con-
front the judicial process. This confrontation is supremely important
in vindicating his rights and preserving his dignity. When the alleg-
edly incompetent defendant is forced to accept unwanted representa-
tion, the invariable result is a deprivation of the defendant's substan-
tive rights. By recognizing the freedom to choose, and the right and
responsibility to suffer the consequences, for good or ill, we support
and defend one of the cornerstones of our way of life-human dig-
nity and individual autonomy.
